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Abstract— For human-robot cooperation, inferring a hu-
man’s cognitive state is very important for an efficient and
natural interaction. Similar to human-human cooperation,
understanding what the partner plans and knowing, if he is
situation aware, is necessary to prevent collisions, offer support
at the right time, correct mistakes before they happen or choose
the best actions for oneself as early as possible.
We propose a model-based belief filter to extract relevant
aspects of a human’s mental state online during cooperation. It
performs inference based on human actions and its own task
knowledge, modeling cognitive processes like perception and
action selection. In contrast to most prior work, we explicitly
estimate the human belief instead of inferring only a single
mode or intention. Since this is a double inference process, we
focus on representing the human estimates of environmental
state and task as well as corresponding uncertainties.
We designed a human-robot cooperation experiment that
allowed for a variety of cognitive states of both agents and
collected data to test and evaluate the proposed belief filter.
The results are promising, as our system can be used to
provide reasonable predictions of the human action and insights
into his situation awareness. At the same time it is inferring
interpretable information about the underlying cognitive states
– A belief about the human’s belief about the environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Robots and other (partially) autonomous technical systems
are more and more present in our daily and working life,
examples include vacuum cleaning robots, manufacturing
robots, intelligent application software or advanced driver as-
sistance systems. Particularly classical manufacturing robots
often have very narrow use-cases, because they are limited
to work in dedicated areas to protect people from harm
(separation of space). This often demotes them to mere
tools, that is humans are delegating defined functions to
those technical systems (functional separation), e.g. a vac-
uum cleaning robot is clearly supposed to clean a room.
Those approaches become more and more inappropriate
due to the high complexity and interdependence of modern
technical systems. For a next generation, it is important
to investigate interaction between humans and autonomous
technical systems to create interfaces that are comprehensible
and efficient, enabling a natural cooperation. Application
scenarios for human-robot cooperation include cooperative
manufacturing, shared autonomy teleoperation, path planning
in crowded environments or semi-autonomous traffic. For
the cooperation of humans and machines, complex aspects
known from human-human interaction become important,
including situation awareness, predictability, trust, intention,
desires or affect. Using these aspects requires some basic
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understanding of the human cognition and its representation
of the environment.
Human situation awareness (SA) in particular covers many
important parts of the human cognitive state. SA is a topic of
interest especially in aviation research [1] since many years.
It proved to be an efficient concept to evaluate and enhance
the performance of a human operator in his interaction with
a machine. Situation awareness goes beyond the perception
of relevant pieces of information, like flight variables (e.g.
altitude) or the environmental states (e.g. location of other
aircrafts). The human has to relate different information
fragments (low altitude is necessary while landing, but
dangerous during flight) and anticipate the consequences.
Along these lines, we propose that a robot also needs to be
situation aware to be able to solve more complex tasks. For a
collaborative setting, SA will also include awareness of the
interaction partner and his internal processes, for example
if a human partner is situation aware himself. With this
knowledge a robot can warn or direct the human’s attention,
provide additional information or adapt its own strategy to
prevent failures or improve overall task performance. For this
reason, we want to model the relevant cognitive processes
of a human partner involved in solving a collaborative task.
But since we can not directly access them, we will infer
the hidden information indirectly through reasoning over
the human’s actions and active sensing strategies. Indeed,
humans are really good in inferring the mental states of their
human partners [2].
One interesting requirement for SA is the understanding of
the task goals and valuations. In machine learning research
one concept of inferring these is Inverse Reinforcement
Learning (IRL) [3]. Reinforcement learning tackles the prob-
lem of an agent selecting actions to optimize accumulated
future reward in a dynamic environment. IRL in contrast
infers the reward function from an observed optimal action
sequence. It was previously proposed to specify the goal for a
robot in collaborative settings, implicitly taking into account
some of the cognitive state variables of a human partner [4].
In [5] IRL was used in an automotive context to predict a
human’s most likely future action and to incorporate it into
the planning process of a robotic agent. IRL focuses on infer-
ring the reward function based on human actions, however, to
appropriately handle situation awareness, additional aspects
have to be considered.
Among human actions, gaze is an important information
source to estimate which aspects of the environment the
human might be aware of. Gaze as active observation is
proposed to obtain the object of human attention awareness
for a collaborative setting in [6]. Similarly, in an automotive
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context, [7], [8], estimation of a human’s focus of attention
is extracted from gaze information to estimate his situation
awareness. [9] investigate gaze as communication, that is
used to coordinate actions by looking at the other. In the
remainder of this paper, we will call active observations
like this gathering actions, because they can be used for our
inferences in a way similar to task-progressing actions. This
can, for example, also be seen in [10], where the authors
use IRL on gaze behavior to infer the internal valuation of
awareness of certain information for a given task.
The combination of both task actions and gathering ac-
tions, should provide a more complete view over the human
cognitive states. As task structure and perception are not
free of noise and might only be partially observable, the
cognitive human state will include a belief, i.e. a probabilistic
representation of his environment. Previous belief inference
concepts are proposed in [11] and [12] interpreting an agent’s
action and information gain. [11] use belief recursion to an
arbitrary depth (i.e. he believes that I believe...) for including
the cognitive state of an interaction partner into the decision
making. They apply it to a game-like multi-agent scenario
with prespecified policies for the (artificial) agents and were
able to solve cooperative problems. In contrast, [12] observe
a human moving in a grid world while approaching a desired
food truck. They want to explain the observed behavior
retrospectively by inferring the human’s desires and beliefs
based on his actions and a simple perception model. The
human belief is sampled uniformly and inferred after task
completion. The results are compared to simpler (heuristic)
human models and to human observer assessments.
In this paper, we develop a general concept for inferring
belief and situation awareness of a human cooperation part-
ner from information gathering and task actions. We use an
application scenario, inspired by human-robot cooperative
manufacturing, with a shared task and goal and the potential
for supportive warning actions and predictive adaptation of
the robot strategy. This direct interaction target requires a
formulation for online estimation of a human’s belief, in
contrast to [12]. Our approach introduces a parametrized
approximation of the human belief that concentrates on sig-
nificant aspects of the cognitive state. Through this, inferring
the complete human belief over the environment reduces to
the inference of the parameters which form the basis for
estimating his situation awareness.
The remaining paper is structured as follows: First, we
will describe our general concept for filtering the human
belief based on his task and gathering actions. Therefor, we
introduce a parametrization of the human belief to support
online inference. We describe our cooperative human-robot
experiment and specify the inference processes for this sce-
nario. The collected data is finally used to test and evaluate
our inference process.
II. MODEL-BASED ONLINE BELIEF FILTER
We present our approach for inferring the human belief.
Our goal is the enhancement of human-robot cooperation,
where the robot should adapt its behavior based on the hu-
man’s situation awareness. This is done through inference of
the human belief regarding relevant parts of the common task
during execution. Therefore, we use human actions as well
as his information gathering and respect its consequences for
the human state of mind to generate a complete view.
We formalize our problem in the Partially Observable
Markov Decision Process (POMDP) framework [13]. The
environmental state s is changed to the next state s′ through
actions a by the agents, according to the dynamics, called
the transition function, T (s′|s, a). A reward signal provides
possibly delayed feedback on the quality of the behavior of
the agents. It is assumed that they select their actions trying
to maximize the overall reward. The system state s is not
directly accessible by the agents, but has to be inferred from
the perceived observations o(a, s). Based on this information,
an agent can construct a belief over the state, b = p(s),
which means integrating action and observation histories into
a probability distribution of the current state.
We assume that the human creates a belief bH based
on which he selects his actions. The belief of the human
is only partially observable to the robot, it can not look
into the human brain. Instead it only knows the human’s
action and information gathering activities, which provide
information of the human observations. Inferring the human
belief results in a probability distribution over a probability
distribution, which quickly gets to complex for interesting
real-world scenarios. Therefore, we approximate the human
belief through a sparse parametrized distribution and infer its
parameters. With an appropriate parameter selection, we will
show that we can still recover a representation containing the
task relevant aspects.
A. Representation
The belief bH = p(s, T ) describes the human’s internal
state as distribution over the state and transition function
(the transition belief could be subsumed in the state belief
by defining the base MDP in a different way). Constructing
a probability distribution p(bH) is unfeasible for real world
scenarios.
We parametrize an approximate belief distribution bH ≈
q(s, T |θ) with parameters θ that focuses on regions, where
the belief is high. The most probable belief µ = argmax(bH)
is represented together with its probability α = bH(µ)
as parameters θ = (µ, α). In a continuous space, one
could alternatively approximate the human belief through
a normal distribution with parameters mean and precision.
Representing only one state in the belief can be limiting,
especially for multimodal cases. This can be easily overcome
by separately modeling the k most probable states.
In the following, we consider a general parametrization θ
for the human belief and develop our filter equations to infer
the distribution p(θ) over the parameters.
B. Filter structure
We model the human as rational agent acting in a POMDP.
The cognitive human processes that we respect are shown in
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Fig. 1a. Based on his belief, the human will decide on the
next action, that can be information gathering (e.g. gaze shift)
leaving the state unchanged or an action that leads to a state
transition of the environment. Information gathering will
result in an observation, providing information the human
uses to update his belief. For task actions, the human will
respect the expected transition of the environmental state,
updating his state belief according to his transition belief.
In Fig. 1b the temporal and causal relations of the filter
variables are shown in the form of a Dynamic Bayesian
Network. It includes the relations from Fig. 1a to update
its representation in the same way, we suppose the human
does, according to action and information gathering. Since
the human action decision is supposed to be based on his
belief, we can use the actual decision as noisy corrective
information to reduce deviation between belief estimate and
the true belief.
Human
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Action
aH
Environment
state
s
Decision
Transition
model
T (bH , aH)
Transition/
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Observation
o
(a) Structure of modeled mental
processes
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Fig. 1: Model structure
C. Expected human observations
Human observations are not directly accessible, but we
can attribute them based on human information gathering.
For example, if someone looks at an object (directs his gaze
towards it), one assumes that he observed that object and
integrated its presence in his internal environment represen-
tation. Therefore, based on (information gathering) action
by the human, aH , we conclude on his observation, p(o|aH)
(perception model). An observation will lead to an update
of human belief, p(s, T |o) ∼ p(o|s, T )p(s, T ). We therefore
have to update the parameters θ
p(θ|aH) ∼
∑
s,T,o
p(o|s, T )q(s, T |θ)p(θ)p(o|aH), (1)
where the observation probabilities p(o|s, T ) depend on the
concrete, application specific perception model.
D. Actions
For human actions, we have to do two further effects,
feedback based on human action selection and the state
transition. The first is based on the assumption, that the
human decides approximately rationally and we calculate the
action probabilities according to a softmax model as
p(aH |θ) ∼ exp(τQ(a, s|θ)), (2)
where Q(a, s|θ) is the action value function depending on
the belief parameters θ. τ is a temperature hyperparameter,
characterizing the human degree of rationality.
The corrective update can be computed as
p(θ|aH) ∼ p(aH |θ)p(θ). (3)
The action value function Q could be obtained from a
POMDP solver, e.g. [14]. Using an online method like this,
the distribution over θ might be sampled to reduce the
required processing load.
For task progressing actions, the human expects a transi-
tion of the system state s to a new state s′. He will update
his belief and the new distribution of the parameters after
state transition p(θ′) becomes:
p(θ′|aH) =
∑
s,T,θ,s′
p(θ′|s′, θ) p(s′|s, T, aH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T (s′, s, aH)
q(s, T |θ)p(θ|aH),
(4)
where p(θ′|s′, θ) ∼ p(s′|θ′)p(θ′|θ) is the approximation of
bH(s
′) through our parametrization.
E. Belief evaluation and situation awareness estimation
The inferred human belief can be used to enhance co-
operation in various ways. In Eq. (2) we already compute
a probabilistic action prediction. But we want not only to
predict but to understand the human behavior to improve the
cooperation on another level, e.g. providing him necessary
information. Therefore we use the belief to evaluate the
situation awareness of the human. We call a human situation
aware, if the optimal action cost based on his belief is not
significantly worse than the best action cost given perfect
knowledge. If this is the case, the human belief contains all
relevant information for optimal action selection. To evaluate
it, the robot itself must be aware of the situation, since we
need this knowledge to estimate the human belief.
The approach for filtering the human belief was introduced
on a general level. We will now move to a concrete situation
to apply and test it. In the following section, we present our
human-robot cooperation experiment and the application of
the human belief inference.
III. EXPERIMENTS
We designed a cooperative experiment with the objective
of generating useful data to evaluate our approach. This
has several requirements: The final target is an application
to a real-world task, e.g. a cooperative manufacturing task,
which we want to represent in an abstracted way. We need
interaction in the form of interdependence between robot
and human. Further, we require a planning process by the
participants to include temporal aspects and raise the com-
plexity, which we need to achieve variability in the human
performance. It should also be possible to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the agents. Inspired by cooperative manufacturing,
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we selected a sequential task, where a human and a robot
have to press buttons in a specific order. Each button press
can represent a processing step of the manufacturing task.
The abstraction of using buttons has the advantage that we
avoid domain specific difficulties for the robot, like complex
controllers to grasp tools. Further, the workspace provides
the opportunity to realize other application scenarios.
A. Setup
robot task state
Fig. 2: Experimental setup for human robot cooperation
experiment, gathering buttons on human board in white.
Our setup consists of a cooperative workspace for human
and robot, as shown in figure 2. The robot is a one arm
industrial UR5 robot, designed for operating with humans in
a common workspace. Both agents, human and robot have a
board on the table with 9 buttons in a 3 times 3 grid in front
of them. The buttons can be set to different colors which
are used to distinguish different actions. A screen on the
wall is used to display task relevant information, e.g. task
sequence or state. Human pose and gaze can be measured,
but are not used so far. Instead, gaze as active observation
is abstracted by discrete gathering actions on a subset of the
buttons, as explained below. Currently, we do not use direct
physical intersection, the agents stay in separated working
areas. Interdependence is achieved through the task and the
need for respecting the other’s actions in planning.
B. Task design
The task consists of pressing colored buttons in a given
order. It is automatically generated following specified rules
to respect our demands. An example structure is shown in
Fig. 3. Distinct actions are represented by button colors. The
shape serves to distinguish the actor, squares for robot actions
and circles for human actions. The nodes between the actions
are used as system states and pressing the button marked on
an outgoing edge leads to a transition to the linked node.
The task starts at the most left node, ends at the goal node
on the right, and is shared between both agents. Different
paths are possible to achieve the goal, since there are states
with multiple outgoing edges, leading to different branches
of the graph. Both actors can be in situations, where they
select a branch by taking an action. Starting on the left-most
node of Fig. 3, the robot can decide between upper path
(pressing yellow) and lower path (pressing red). The human
has to track the robot’s decision to determine subsequent
actions. If the robot presses the yellow button, the human
has to press the purple one subsequently. We introduced the
branching to force planning over purely reactive behavior and
to achieve the required interaction and complexity. Taking
an action in a state where it is not a specified transition is
a mistake and leads to a negative reward, while the state
remains unchanged. To achieve the desired task complexity,
we generate tasks with a size of 8 states.
The explicit task is generated with randomly varying
branching and merging points and button attributions. The
mapping of colors to the buttons is changed between tasks
to avoid habituation.
Fig. 3: Cooperative task plan example
In addition to the colored buttons, we take human informa-
tion gathering into account. To focus on the actual inference
process, we introduce discrete gathering actions as temporary
simplification. Therefore we use three buttons, illuminated in
white (Fig. 2). By holding them, the human obtains a certain
piece of information on the screen. “Task gathering” displays
the whole task as in Fig. 3. “State gathering” shows the
actual state of the environment as node in the graph including
last and next action(s). “Robot gathering” visualizes the
robot button approach to distinguish between different robot
actions. Due to this explicit robot gathering action, we want
to avoid direct visual information and the robot is simulated
during the main part of the experiment.
We introduce a gathering cost through a time delay for
displaying the information. The human should always track
the environmental state, therefore we use the highest delay
of one second for that. Gathering the task is delayed by a
half second, the task is already shown at the start of each run
but difficult to remember. Since the robot moves and acts,
the human needs to dynamically adapt to what it does, so
we assign no further delay for robot gathering.
In our current experiments, the robot randomly presses one
of the next buttons from the task. The intention behind this is
that the human has to actively track the robot’s actual action.
When the robot chooses a path, the human has to be aware
of the actual decision, which he can achieve through robot
gathering. This robot selection strategy is communicated to
the participant before an experiment. The actual as well as
simulated button press produces a sound, from which the
human can infer the end of the robot action execution and
the related state transition. After the sound, he can continue
with the next action. The robot needs about 2 to 6 seconds
for pressing a button, depending on the button location. This
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is normally sufficient for the human to gather information
towards the upcoming parts. Varying the robot’s speed would
be a way to adapt the human stress level.
The reward function contains two parts, the number of
false button presses and the execution time. The human
has to balance between performing fast with the risk of
mistakes and performing safely with the cost of time through
information gathering. He is told about both aspects without
the explicit weighting to avoid further confusion. At the end
of the task, we provide feedback in form of a score. From
these it should be possible to get at least an intuition on the
weights, however they may have their individual weighting,
which we represent as static hyperparameter w.
At the beginning of each task run, called episode, the
corresponding graph is displayed on the screen for three
seconds. This time is designed to be insufficient for the
human to memorize every aspect so the human has to use
the task gathering button during execution. The experimental
procedure of several tasks starts with a habituation phase,
where the human has the chance to learn the overall principle,
how to progress, and to get used to the gathering buttons.
After this habituation phase of 5 episodes, we recorded the
execution of 20 tasks.
We performed experiments with 9 participants. 21 times,
that is 5% of the task actions, a false button was pressed by
the human. The execution time as second measure varied
a lot (STD 1.8 s, Mean 2.2 s) between different episodes
and participants. From the frequent usage of the gathering
actions, we conclude that memory is a significant limitation
in our task. For future work it will be interesting to deal with
other (e.g physical) limitations of the human.
In average, the participants took 2.4 task actions and 3
gatherings per episode. We observed differing strategies by
the participants regarding task gathering versus state gather-
ing. Indeed, there is information overlap, because gathering
the state also provides the information over the immediate
next action(s). However, the strategy of relying mainly on
state gathering is not globally optimal, because it neither
allows to choose the best path nor to prepare a sequence of
consecutive human actions. Instead, it seems to be a local
optimum in the human learning process. This strategy was
observed mainly for participants 2, 3 and 4 and partly for 5.
C. Filter specification
We now apply the general belief inference concept from
section II. As environmental state s we refer to the current
node number of the task graph. The transition function T is
specified by the task.
1) Representation: We are interested in three aspects of
the human belief bH , namely the state, the transition function
and the belief over the next robot action. We parametrize and
update these independently (but with the same observations).
For the state belief we use one parameter describing
the most probable state µs = argmaxs(bH(s)) and its
probability αs = bH(µs). As prior we use the start state,
p(µs = 0) = 1.
For the transition dynamics we represent the structure as
adjacency matrix TH as part of the true transition function
T , together with several probability parameters αT . We
further divide the human task belief in two parts, the overall
structure respectively connectivity and the actual buttons
connecting the nodes. Since we designed the task such that
the human is unable to memorize it completely, we model
two sequential steps by the human. The first is the selection
of one single path through the graph whereupon he tries to
capture the corresponding buttons. This structure consisting
of one possible paths is represented as connectivity matrix
CT together with a probability αT,C . Further, the human
needs to know the required actions to proceed on the selected
path. To respect the human memory limitation, we introduce
a hyperparameter nmem for the memory size, characterizing
the number of buttons, the human can remember. Based
on short term memory research, we select four as typical
number [15]. Within this assumption, we have nmem many
parameters µT,i of most probable buttons along the path and
the corresponding probabilities αT,i (i = 1 . . . nmem). The
connectivity matrix CT and the colors µT,i are combined
in the adjacency matrix TH . Together with the probabilities
αT , it forms the task parametrization, for which we use a
uniform prior.
In situations, where the robot has multiple action options,
the human needs to know, what action the robot performs.
Therefore, we represent the belief for the current robot action
bH(aR). Because we informed the human about the random
action selection by the robot, we assume, that he has a
uniform prior over robot actions. When the human gathers
information on the robots movement, his belief will update to
the true action, b(aR = aR,true) = 1. Since the robot action
belief is clear and only important for the current node, we do
not use a probabilistic representation for it. The used belief
representation combines all three aspects, the parameters are
θ =
(
µs αs TH αT µR
)
.
2) Observations: Each gathering action is assumed to lead
to an observation and a corresponding belief update by the
human. Therefore, we have to specify the observation proba-
bilities p(o|s, T ) from Eq. (1). With the discrete information
buttons in our experiment, the observations are clearly related
to these and assumed to provide reliable information.
Accordingly, task gathering sets the human task prob-
abilities αT to one and the estimates to the true values.
Gathering the state will display the actual state together with
the immediate next action(s). Thus state µs and and the next
button color µT,1 are updated to the true values and the
corresponding certainties αs and αT,0 becomes one. Lastly,
information of the robot’s movement will lead to certain
human knowledge, regarding the robot action.
For another observation type, the sound triggered by a
robot action, we use Eq. (1), where we have to spec-
ify the observation probability p(oaR|s, T ). It results from
the probability for any robot action in the current state,
p(oaR|s, T ) =
∑
aR
p(aR|s, T ). A robot action leads to
a (possibly uncertain) state transition, changing the human
belief over state. The parametrization updates to p(θ′) =
5
∑
aR
p(θ′|aR)p(aR|µR), where p(θ′|aR) results from Eq.
(4), replacing human with robot action.
3) Human action: For the update of p(θ) according to
human actions, we need to compute the action value function
Q(a, θ). For our relatively simple task, we can declare an ac-
tion value function by hand and do not need to use a POMDP
solver. The expected value of the action µT,1 depends on
the probability for state and task, Q(µT,1) = αT,1αs,
describing the risk of failure. Gathering actions augment
the human corresponding probabilities α and increase the
following success probability. However, if the task progress
depends on the human action, gathering will delay the task
progress and therefore result in a gathering cost c. The
resulting action values are Q(state) = 1−cstate, Q(task) =
αs(1+γαT,2:)−ctask, Q(robot) = αT,1αs+cstate with the
corresponding gathering costs for states µs, where the human
can progress.
Therefore we used −1 as reward for a false action and the
gathering costs from time delay, multiplied by the false/time
ratio, w = 3/s. Choosing a longer path augments the time
needed and results in an additional cost for those actions.
Gathering the task reduces the human’s uncertainty not only
for the next action but also for future actions. The benefit
of future uncertainty reduction may be discounted by some
factor γ, modeled as hyper parameter. We set it to γ = 0.5
and use a rationality parameter τ = 3.
D. Results
The principle of belief inference is demonstrated in Fig.
4 for a part of a recorded run. The relevant part of the
task structure is shown in a). The human presses the purple
button in b), transitioning to the next task state. In c), the
result of the inference process after this action is visualized.
The inferred state belief p(µs) is represented through the
width of the pentagon on the node. The probability for the
human state estimate µs is concentrated on the first state.
One part of the task belief is shown by the empty symbols,
representing buttons probably unknown for the human. In
this state, the robot can press dark blue or rose, leading
to different branches. Since the robot chooses the action
randomly, the human should gather the robot’s movement
to track the state transition. Our filter predicts this action
as most likely by the human. In this recording however, the
human does not follow our prediction, while the robot presses
dark blue in d). In the updated belief estimate e), multiple
states regarding human belief µs are possible. Additionally
a low human state certainty αs (not illustrated) is estimated.
Due to that, the filter predicts state gathering by the human,
which he actually does in the next step f). Consequently,
the new state belief of the human is concentrated on the
true state and the next action options should be known by
the human g). Latest after the next human action (purple
or light blue) we expect him to gather for task, since we
estimate the human to be uncertain about the subsequent
colors (represented as white circles).
When introducing interaction, e.g. providing specific miss-
ing information to the human, an online calculation is neces-
sary. Each of our belief update steps is computed sufficiently
fast, it takes less than 5ms on a standard desktop PC with
3.2 GHz single core computation.
For a quantitative evaluation, we compute the hit rate of
the action prediction. According to Eq. (2), we calculate
action probabilities and compare the most probable with the
actual human action. Since there are cases with multiple
appropriate action (e.g. branching over comparable paths),
we use as second measure the likelihood, the probability our
filter attributes to the actual human action.The hit rate of the prediction is shown in Fig. 5a. The
averaged rate is 56%, but varies between the participants.
We compute a statistical baseline over all participants, that
always predicts the most frequent action (task gathering,
26%). For comparison, we let an expert (first author) predict
the human actions using the same information (action history
and task knowledge) as our system (59%). The low success
rate for participants 2 and 3 might result from a suboptimal
strategy that they use (which violates the rationality assump-
tion). Focusing only on predicting human task actions, the
success rate is significantly higher at 82%. It is most difficult
to predict the gathering actions for task and state correctly.
Looking at the experts performance, our task seems to have
some general problems regarding predictability.
The average likelihoods, assigned to the performed human
actions, are shown in Fig. 5b, the mean inference result is
51%. Again, we calculate a statistical baseline (relative action
frequencies). The expert was restricted to spread his predic-
tion uniformly over (multiple) actions. We observe several
cases, where two actions or three gathering actions of the
human are reasonable and the action prediction distributed.
Finally, we analyze the influence of the hyperparameters.
Once selected, they are held constant for the evaluation of
all participants, to achieve better comparisons. The memory
parameter is varied between 2 and 8 with little effects
regarding the hit rate, shifting towards prediction of task
progressing actions. In fact, our memory model is simple and
e.g. the existing dependence on the task complexity (number
of branches) is not respected. The rationality parameter has
almost no influence on the hit rate. The action distribution
becomes sharper which leads to more peaked probability pre-
dictions. Most influence results from the weighting parameter
of the human reward function, the ratio error to time (in
seconds). An increased time cost leads to better prediction
results. Over the ratios 0.1 to 100 the prediction rate rises
from 52 to 59 %.
The belief inference produces plausible qualitative behav-
ior and the prediction results are promising. Further analysis
is necessary to ascertain the performance of our approach
and the specific parametrization.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We presented an approach for inferring human belief to es-
timate his situation awareness, relying on human information
gathering and human actions. We proposed to approximate
the human belief distribution with a parametrized distribu-
tion, allowing the inference of these parameters without need
for double inference.
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Fig. 4: Example case, a) describes the task, b), d) and f) show three consecutive button presses, c), e) and g) represent the
estimated human belief after the corresponding action.
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Fig. 5: Evaluation of action prediction
Inspired by the needs and structure of a cooperative
manufacturing task, we designed a human-robot experiment,
where we applied the belief inference method. We looked
at different cases of the experiment and could verify the
qualitative consistence with human observers. The action
prediction based on the inferred belief produced promising
results.
We will analyze the capabilities and limits of the proposed
inference method, regarding parametrization as well as other
application scenarios. One extension would be the use of
Inverse Reinforcement Learning to infer the actual human
reward function instead of static modeling.
Future research will further be directed towards enhancing
cooperation of human and robot with the knowledge of
internal human beliefs. Therefore we want to evaluate the
human’s situation awareness and adapt the robot behavior to
warn or inform the human and to optimize the joint behavior.
We think that we need the knowledge of human cognitive
states to achieve the goal of making human-robot cooperation
more efficient and intuitive.
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